Monday, December 14, 2015

India's huge stakes in Myanmar

India stands to gain a lot from Myanmar walking away from China’s embrace and turning democratic. As the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is visiting Myanmar next month, there is a lot to reconsider in the two countries’ relationship.
Very few observers in India and indeed across the world could have predicted the sudden change of course by the ruling military junta in Myanmar and its new-found love for democracy. Now, of course, it seems that democracy is on an irreversible course in Myanmar, particularly after the recent by-elections, which clearly brought out the overwhelming support for Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).
There has been a plethora of visits by important world leaders to Myanmar like the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the British Foreign Secretary William Hague and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Koichiro Genba. Following suit soon will be the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who the Indian media has reported will be visiting Myanmar next month and when that happens, it will not come a day too soon.  It will also be the first Indian Prime Ministerial visit to Myanmar after a long gap of 25 years.
India stands to gain a lot from Myanmar walking away from China’s embrace and turning democratic.  During the US President Barack Obama’s visit to India in November 2010, he had chided the Indian establishment for “not doing enough” to promote democracy in Myanmar.  However, India has had its own reasons for dealing with the military junta in Myanmar. India had initially strongly supported the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar after the annulment of the 1990 election results by the junta, but as Myanmar inched closer to China, India decided to change tack.  

It was the then Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh's landmark visit to Myanmar in 2001 that helped to break the ice, though the then Indian Foreign Secretary J.N Dixit’s Yangon visit in March 1993 had helped to set the ball rolling. Jaswant Singh’s visit was the first to Myanmar by an Indian Foreign Minister in 20 years. Since then, there has been a steady stream of high-level visits from both sides, including the visit last year in October by the Myanmarese President U Thein Sein. As of 2010-11, the total bilateral trade stood at US$ 1067.05 million.
So, why is Myanmar crucial for India?
Firstly, Myanmar is India’s land-bridge to the ASEAN region and is hence critical for the success of its “Look-East Policy” which aims at re-establishing close ties with the countries of Southeast and East Asia.
Secondly, Myanmar shares a long 1600-km land border with India’s Northeastern region, which has many active militant groups. Many of these groups in the past (and even now) have found shelter in Myanmar. Close ties will help India persuade Myanmar not to give shelter to anti-India elements.
Thirdly, Myanmar is rich in oil and natural gas-which India’s booming economy desperately needs. India has been scouting across the world for oil and gas resources and Myanmar is India’s immediate neighbour, which will enable India to cut down transportation costs and the risks involved. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI) has been a non-starter because of factors like American opposition to the same and the worrisome security situation in Pakistan. Already India’s state-owned ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited)-Videsh and GAIL(Gas Authority of India Limited) have made significant investments in the oil and gas sector in Myanmar.
Fourthly, it helps to reduce China’s growing strategic footprint in India’s neighbourhood. The Myanmarese junta had allegedly allowed China to set up a listening post at Coco Islands, abutting India’s Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands. Recently, India had to vote against Sri Lanka at a recent session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on a resolution for 'promoting reconciliation and accountability' in Sri Lanka because of domestic political compulsions, whereas China, Pakistan and Bangladesh supported Sri Lanka.
Fifthly, Myanmar is crucial for India’s land connectivity with the rest of the Southeast Asian region. India has already built the India-Myanmar Friendship Road, between Tamu and Kalemayo in Myanmar and running onward to Kalewa, which will help India get land-connectivity to the other Southeast Asian countries.
Meanwhile, Myanmar also has a lot to gain from better and close ties with India.
India, as the world’s biggest democracy can do a few things for Myanmar, which China cannot, despite its economic and strategic influence. India with its democratic credentials and close relations with the U.S. and other Western and Asian powers can help Myanmar get full international acceptability, while gently prodding it to keep up its tryst with democracy.
India is already involved in a host of infrastructure and energy projects in Myanmar. Besides, it has provided 32 Myanmarese cities with high speed data link while Indian firms are involved in the development of Myanmar’s railway network, including the supply of railway coaches and locos.  India has set a target of June 2013 to complete the $120-million Sittwe deep water port in Myanmar.  This will be a game-changer for India’s landlocked Northeast as once the project is completed, vessels would be able to ply between India’s landlocked Northeastern state of Mizoram and the Sittwe port.
So, how can India help Myanmar as it takes baby-steps towards democracy?
Firstly, India should announce additional lines of credit to Myanmar, taking into consideration the areas that need immediate attention. During the Myanmarese President U Thein Sein’s state visit to India in October 2011, India announced the extension of an US$500 million Line of Credit to Myanmar.  This is in addition to the Lines of Credit of close to US$ 300 million that had been extended by India to Myanmar in the past.  In fact, Myanmar is as important for India’s national security as Afghanistan and just like India has given massive amounts of aid to Afghanistan; it should be prepared to do likewise in Myanmar.
Secondly, India should provide additional technical assistance and manpower, especially in the field of I-T, India’s key strength. Already, an India-Myanmar Centre for Enhancement of IT Skills (IMCEITS) is in operation in Myanmar.
Thirdly, India needs to help Myanmar get full international acceptability, especially now that India is a non-permanent member of the UNSC (United Nations Security Council)
Fourthly, India would do well to relax visa regimes for Myanmarese nationals (particularly those visiting India for religious purposes) and announce special scholarships for Myanmarese students to come and study at Indian institutions.
Fifthly, India could announce some unilateral concessions so that selected Myanmarese products can enter the Indian market. As the bigger partner, India has to be prepared to give Myanmar some unilateral concessions.
Sixthly, the Indian private sector should also be roped in on a bigger scale, especially in the infrastructure sector.  The kind of averseness to risks that the Indian private sector has shown does not augur well for them and for a rising power like India.
The entry of the private sector will also help to speed up the implementation of certain key projects.
Lastly, India should take the initiative to start bus services between Myanmar and some cities in Northeast India, taking a cue from the Delhi-Lahore and Kolkata-Dhaka bus services, while strictly ensuring that illegal weapons and narcotics do not find their way to India.
In some other areas, India will have to move cautiously. While India and Myanmar have agreed to cooperate in the implementation of the Tamanthi and Shwezaye power projects on the Chindwin river basin in Myanmar, it should learn from the Chinese mistake and avoid going ahead with the same. In September last year, the Myanmarese junta had suspended the construction of the Chinese-built $3.6billion Myitsone hydroelectricity project on the Irrawaddy river, which would have mostly supplied electricity to China. There was a massive public outcry against the project, which forced the Myanmarese government to retract and India would do well not to repeat the same mistake.
India’s policy towards its neighbours has rarely been successful. Myanmar gives India a golden chance to start afresh and upend its neighbourhood policy.  Myanmar will be a crucial test of India’s foreign policy, especially as it aspires for a seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and hence it calls for some out-of-the-box thinking.

2. India wades into the South China sea dispute


In a significant and deft move, India recently dispatched a naval contingent on a goodwill visit to Southeast Asia and East Asia.  This contingent will make port calls in the Southeast Asian countries of Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and then move on to Japan and China.  This move by India comes at a time when tensions have risen in the South China Sea, especially between countries like the Philippines and China.  However, the inclusion of China in the itinerary shows the intention of India’s strategic planners to keep channels of communication open with China and not to send wrong signals to China, despite differences in many areas. 
In October 2011, India’s state-owned oil behemoth Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed an agreement with PetroVietnam to “jointly explore upstream and down-stream opportunities in India, Vietnam and other countries”. ONGC’s foreign arm, the ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has already been involved in exploring energy resources in Vietnam. However, on this occasion many sections in China went hammer and tongs at India and the influential Global Times newspaper in China in an article (published a few days after this agreement was signed) titled “India-Vietnam joint work must be halted” warned that “India is willing to fish in the troubled waters of the South China Sea so as to accumulate bargaining chips on other issues with China”. It went on to say, “China should denounce this agreement as illegal. Once India and Vietnam initiate their exploration, China can send non-military forces to disturb their work, and cause dispute or friction to halt the two countries' exploration.” India chose not to heed the “warning” and moved ahead with the exploration.
India, of course, is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China when it comes to naval strength in the South China Sea, but has been stitching up close naval ties with a series of countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia, all of whom would like to see the South China Sea continue to be an international waterway.  India has been conducting the “Milan” multinational exercises since 1991 with Southeast Asian navies and including those from Australia and New Zealand.  With Thailand, India has been conducting India - Thailand Coordinated Patrol (INDO-THAI CORPAT) to counter terrorism, piracy and arms smuggling since 2006.  Meanwhile, India and Singapore have been conducting the annual naval SIMBEX (the Singapore-Indian Maritime Bilateral Exercises) since 1994.  India will be holding its first-ever bilateral naval exercise with Japan later this year.  Last year, Japan pulled out of the trilateral Malabar naval exercise alongside India and the US because of the Great East Japan earthquake. Prior to that in 2009, the three countries had held trilateral naval exercises. China had allegedly built a listening post in Myanmar’s Coco Islands, very close to India’s strategically important Andaman and Nicobar chain of islands.  However, with Myanmar taking baby steps to democracy, China may no longer have such a leeway with the government in Naypyitaw.
What are India’s interests in the South China Sea?
India does not have any territorial interests in the South China Sea, but it has huge economic interests. ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has already pumped in around US$225 million into Vietnam. It is also important to note that India’s trade with Japan and South Korea has been growing and hence it is crucial that freedom of navigation is maintained in the South China Sea through which the trading routes between India and these East Asian countries pass. Meanwhile, India-ASEAN trade has reached US$ 57.89 billion in 2010-11. Any major conflict in the South China Sea region is bound to impact Indian economic interests.       
India is poised to play a greater role in the region, thanks to the growing strength of its Navy.  It is expected to take delivery of the refitted aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov by next year from Russia while work goes on apace on the indigenous Air Defence Ship (scheduled for completion by 2015.) Meanwhile, India has started the construction of its first indigenous nuclear submarine in 2009 and has plans to induct a third aircraft carrier by 2017.  Last month, the Indian Navy inducted into service the nuclear-powered attack submarine INS Chakra, brought on a 10-year lease from Russia.
However, India would be well-advised not to wade into the territorial disputes between China, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan in the South China Sea region. At the same time, India has to be prepared to deal with a potential skirmish with China in the South China Sea region, taking a cue from what has happened between China and some other countries.  What if a Chinese fishing trawler rams into Indian Navy vessels in the South China Sea? Such scenarios should be thought-out in advance to prevent knee-jerk reactions. At the same time it must be said that there is very less likelihood of any skirmish between India and China going out of control. There are enough avenues for cooperation between India and China in the maritime arena. Interestingly, in March this year, India and China agreed to undertake joint anti-piracy operations and share technological knowledge on seabed research.  This in many ways shows the way out for China and India in managing their conflicting interests in the South China Sea region.  China needs the Indian Navy’s commanding presence in the Indian Ocean region to keep its critical sea lanes of communication operational. At the same time, any conflict with India would also internationalise the South China Sea dispute, something which China desperately wants to avoid. This is something Indian strategic planners would do well to keep in mind. 
India's Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance in recent elections gained an unprecedented majority in parliament. The ruling alliance now commands a majority in the lower, more powerful house of parliament, the Lok Sabha, allowing it to make decisions without the pressures of coalition politics.
     The BJP won an absolute majority of 282 seats, and 336 of the 543 with alliance partners. In the past, governments have not been able to take firm stands on overseas issues because of pressure from coalition allies in regions near neighboring nations. That is not the case anymore.
   Smaller parties in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, which are near Sri Lanka and Bangladesh respectively, have generally taken hard lines. Lawmakers in Tamil Nadu would like to see the Modi government take a strong stand against Sri Lanka on the issue of alleged human rights violations by government forces. West Bengal leaders have in the past scuttled India's proposed deals with Bangladesh on sharing the waters of the Teesta River. The government of new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, with its outright majority, has the political capital to say no.
Close-to-home focus
Modi's foreign policy started on the right note when he invited the heads of state of all South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation nations and Mauritius to his inauguration. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to the ceremony, ignoring the wishes of hard-liners at home. Just before the inauguration, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced his country's decision to release all jailed Indian fishermen.
     India's new External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj's first overseas visit was to Bangladesh; Modi's was to Bhutan. This signals that the new government's priorities lie in India's neighborhood, which was not the case with the previous government.
     The Modi government's emphasis on the neighborhood can be seen in other steps taken. The foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan will meet on Aug. 25, in a fresh bid to kick-start stalled dialogue. In another major development, Indian journalist Ved Prakash Vaidik met up in Pakistan with Hafiz Saeed, the chief of Lashkar-e-Taiba who masterminded the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Vaidik is considered close to the yoga guru Baba Ramdev, who has connections with BJP top brass. The government, however, distanced itself from the meeting.
     Deeper economic integration is also being considered. The government is looking at the possibility of setting up a South Asian bank on the lines of the BRICS one announced recently. Modi also visited Nepal earlier this month. The last Indian prime ministerial visit to Nepal took place 17 years ago. Nepal has huge potential for hydropower, and India could be at the center of a grid connecting South Asian countries.
     Better Nepal ties can help India in other ways. Naxalism (left-wing extremism) is officially termed India's biggest internal security threat. Not much attention has been devoted to it by earlier governments. New National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, however, worked extensively on India's internal security threats and has spent time in neighboring countries. Support from nations such as Nepal, which also have Maoist groups, can help India meet the Naxal challenge.
     China's wooing of the Bhutanese and Nepalese governments has also set Indian alarm bells ringing. The new government thinks more needs to be done to improve India's ties with South Asian countries.

3.

Obama's India visit: Turning the page

The recent visit of U.S. President Barack Obama to India has opened a new chapter in bilateral ties between the two nations. This is the first time an American president has visited India twice during his presidency and also the first time a U.S. president has served as the chief guest at India's Republic Day celebrations.
     Obama's trip caps a successful turnaround in India-U.S. relations, especially after the row between them over the treatment of a female Indian diplomat in the U.S. and differences over a host of issues, including India's nuclear liability act. Things started to improve after the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the U.S. in September of last year. Obama's return courtesy call, just four months later, only goes to show both countries are determined to overcome mistrust. 
     Obama also understands Modi has the capacity to take bold decisions because of the overwhelming majority that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance commands in the Lok Sabha, the more powerful of India's two houses of Parliament. Modi's emphasis on strengthening ties with the U.S. can also be seen from the appointment of S. Jaishankar, India's former ambassador to Washington, as the new foreign secretary after incumbent Sujatha Singh was unceremoniously shunted out.
Important takeaways
The most notable outcome of the Obama visit was that both countries succeeded in operationalizing the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal, which had been stalled and was holding back progress in other areas. This breakthrough was achieved after the U.S. agreed to remove a contentious clause regarding the tracking of nuclear material supplied to India, and India signaled that it is prepared to move forward on the liability issue by offering to set up an insurance pool to bail out companies in the event of an accident.
     The U.S. president reiterated American support for India to become a permanent member of a reformed United Nations Security Council. It is also significant that Obama did not visit Pakistan on this trip, thereby completely delinking America's ties with Pakistan vis-a-vis India. Obama also affirmed U.S. support "towards India's phased entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group," thereby reinforcing faith in India's strong nonproliferation credentials. 
   India's "look east policy" gels well with Washington's "rebalance" toward the Asia-Pacific. New Delhi has had concerns regarding Beijing's attempts to increase its maritime prowess in the Indian Ocean, particularly with initiatives like the "Maritime Silk Road." It is no surprise the Indo-U.S. Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, released during the Obama visit, affirms "the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea." This, however, is not likely to go unnoticed in China and marks a change in the tone and tenor of India's approach to such issues.     
Boost to business
During his visit, Obama committed $4 billion in the form of government-backed investments and loans to New Delhi. Total trade between the two countries stood at $63.7 billion in 2013 while the U.S. is the sixth-largest overseas investor in India. In the past, U.S. companies have had problems with the slow pace of decision-making in India. This seems set to change, especially after the launch of the "Make in India" initiative by the Modi government.
     In the field of defense, the two countries have agreed to pursue "coproduction and codevelopment of four pathfinder projects." American companies like Boeing are aggressively eyeing the Indian defense market, especially after the new government raised the cap on foreign investment in the defense sector to 49% from the earlier limit of 26%. India is also looking at more joint production of military hardware, which presents huge opportunities for American companies. The U.S. is now India's biggest weapons' supplier, though it was quite ironic that at the Republic Day parade, Obama was saluted by Russian-made tanks.

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